作者: Hollis Ashbaugh-Skaife , Ryan LaFond , Brian W. Mayhew
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.305720
关键词: Audit 、 Auditor independence 、 Earnings 、 Purchasing 、 Business 、 Accounting 、 Accrual 、 Compromise 、 Actuarial science 、 Market reaction
摘要: This paper challenges the findings of Frankel, Johnson and Nelson (FJN) (2002). The results our discretionary accruals tests differ from FJN's when we adjust current for firm performance. In earnings benchmark tests, in contrast to FJN find no statistically significant association between firms meeting analyst forecasts auditor fees. Our market reaction also provide different than those reported by FJN. Overall, study indicates that are sensitive research design choices, systematic evidence supporting their claim auditors violate independence as a result clients purchasing relatively more nonaudit services.