Game-theoretic analysis of international climate agreements: the design of transfer schemes and the role of technological change

摘要: Global warming is one of the crucial challenges that world facing now. The allocation reduction efforts among regions has long been negotiated and it will not be an easy task to achieve a full cooperation with stringent targets. thesis examines formation international climate agreements (ICAs) in game-theoretic framework. I analyse strategic behaviour number reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Game-theoretic approaches have widely used examine interaction between countries negotiations on change, emphasised difficulties designing such voluntary agreement. This provides systematic approach impacts designs ICAs success ICAs. In Chapter 2, present basic structure STACO-2.1 model, composed framework applied features, specifications calibrations functions model. results for (i) All Singletons coalition structure, (ii) Grand (iii) all stable structures. case can serve as suitable reference point analysis various mechanisms following chapters. show EU15 Japan stable. Both interest cooperation, because their higher marginal benefits from abatement. suggest relatively lower abatement costs would worse off when they cooperate bear largest burden but obtain least benefits. suggests transfer schemes effective stabilise larger coalitions. 3, impact pragmatic optimal incentives join agreements. With model comprises twelve investigate: benchmark without transfers, scenarios allocation-based rules where members receive tradable emission permits proportional initial or future emissions, outcome-based surplus distributed (iv) scenario based sharing rule outside option payoffs. find scheme poorly designed sense increases free-ride, best performing may than no transfers. our setting this occurs initial-emissions-based permit system (grandfathering). Improvements system, path emissions scheme, do enhance stability For we coalitions, which include key players United States China, stable, capable stabilising Coalition. transfers perform much better more schemes. Such schemes, however, require detailed insight into incentive structures regions. Therefore, there trade-off easier implement are hardly hard actual negotiations. 4, explore how different technology spillover influence Several theories spillovers evaluated by simulating range alternative specifications: spillovers, internal global coalitional (v) extended (all possible spillovers). good instrument increase coalitions associated costs. setting, cannot overcome strong free-rider substantially environmental conclusion robust respect specification spillovers. 5, relax assumption exogenous technological change analysed previous chapters induced (ITC) To reducing regional incentives, three investigated: (noTC), (ExTC), (ITC). Technological It reduces through R&D investments, lowers over time. reveal set best-performing indicator noTC ExTC, ITC does produce Coalitions highest NPV payoffs ITC. indicate investments As result increased abatement, only also singletons high benefits, leads decrease (increase) internally (externally) might improve payoffs, at same time tends due public nature warming. quite productivity R&D. Furthermore, decreases (increases) value R&D, free-riding increase. sensitive changes discount rate. both cases, dominating mechanism rate regions, thus gains incentives. Overall, main finding well-designed facilitate successful partial although still achieve. reason lies characteristics Following insights current literature supports fact agreement highly design feasibility effectiveness. Allocation-based context CO2 role received significant attentions amount Two types sources investigated thesis: investment. If treated private goods, country attractive partner other with, lead paying improvement. Within assumptions here, quantitative cooperating enough freeriding non-cooperative countries, large bring non-cooperating countries. stock knowledge low When signatories Singletons, driven investment after plays increasing freerider non-signatories benefit made signatories. under large, difference source provide any differences terms improvement Kyoto Protocol was first step provided stimulus search policies, issues improved. Now, negotiation post taking place aim tackling Flexible measures win-win involved continue play achieving further pursued.