Rent-Seeking and Grandfathering: The Case of GHG Trade in the Eu

作者: Urs Steiner Brandt , Gert Tinggaard Svendsen

DOI: 10.1260/095830504322986501

关键词: Green paperRent-seekingEconomicsPublic economicsKyoto ProtocolTotal costEnergy policyInternational economicsGreenhouse gasEuropean unionEmissions tradingRenewable Energy, Sustainability and the EnvironmentEnvironmental engineeringEnergy Engineering and Power TechnologyEnergy (miscellaneous)

摘要: The EU Commission has recently proposed a new directive establishing framework for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading within the European Union. idea is to devalue part of emission quotas in circulation by year 2012 at latest, so that will meet its Kyoto target level an 8% GHG reduction. Our main question whether final choice allocation rule can be explained role industrial groups policy making process. We answer this using rent-seeking theory and analysing Green Paper hearing replies from groups. In other words, we want explain observe how (or lobbyism) affects design environmental regulation energy favour well-organized interest argue some firms are likely reap net gain being regulated grandfathered system. This because total costs reduction lobbyism smaller than tota...

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