作者: Jean-Philippe Aumasson , Aikaterini Mitrokotsa , Pedro Peris-Lopez
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-25243-3_7
关键词: Identification (information) 、 Spoofing attack 、 Attack surface 、 Computer science 、 Security analysis 、 Distance-bounding protocol 、 Bounding overwatch 、 Computer network 、 Computer security 、 Relay 、 Protocol (object-oriented programming)
摘要: Distance bounding protocols enable a device to establish an upper bound on the physical distance communication partner so as prevent location spoofing, exploited by relay attacks. Recently, Rasmussen and Capkun (ACM-CCS'08) observed that these leak information of parties external observers, which is undesirable in number applications--for example if leaked leads identification among group devices. To remedy this problem, authors proposed "privacy-preserving" protocol, i.e. leaks no parties. The present paper reports results from in-depth security analysis new with main result attack recovers ephemeral secrets well two for particular choices parameters. Overall, our do not contradict preliminary designers, but rather extends it other parts surface.