Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility.
作者： Santiago Balseiro , Omar Besbes , Francisco Castro
DOI:
关键词: Incentive compatibility 、 Optimal mechanism 、 Mechanism design 、 Optimization problem 、 Incentive 、 Order (ring theory) 、 Solution concept 、 Computer science 、 Mathematical optimization 、 Revenue
摘要: A fundamental assumption in classical mechanism design is that buyers are perfect optimizers. However, in practice, buyers may be limited by their computational capabilities or a lack …
arxiv.org
harvard.edu参考文章(13)
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