Personality influences on ultimatum bargaining decisions

摘要: We investigate individual differences in behaviour within an ultimatum game with advance production. It is a simple bargaining game, which the size of ‘pie’ to be distributed between two parties depends on both players' monetary investments. One player, ‘proposer’, has state demand, can accepted as it or rejected (with consequence zero return for players) by second player (‘responder’). find that global personality measures contribute significantly explanation demands and rejection decisions. Proposers who score high independence tough-mindedness, dimensions affinity selfishness, demand higher shares than proposers low these dimensions. This particularly true when proposer's cost share low, i.e. demanded cannot justified concern equity. In this situation there strong conflict economic rationality Regarding decisions we reciprocity oriented responders (i.e. persons are either emotionally unstable extraverted stable introverted) reject proposal more often others. Rejection unsatisfying offer interpreted act angry retaliation (negative reciprocity) against interaction partner violates social norm Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.