作者: Julian RH Marino , Rubens O Moraes , Claudio Toledo , Levi HS Lelis , None
DOI: 10.1609/AAAI.V33I01.33012330
关键词: Extensive-form game 、 Action (philosophy) 、 Theoretical computer science 、 Selection (relational algebra) 、 Nash equilibrium 、 Evolutionary algorithm 、 Computer science 、 Search algorithm 、 Set (abstract data type) 、 Key (cryptography)
摘要: A key challenge for planning systems in real-time multiagent domains is to search large action spaces decide an agent’s next action. Previous works showed that handcrafted abstractions allow focus their on a subset of promising actions. In this paper we show the problem generating can be cast as selecting pure strategies from pool options. We model selection two-player game which strategy set players powerset options— call game. then present evolutionary algorithm solving such Empirical results small matches µRTS our approach able converge Nash equilibrium Also, larger algorithms using derived by are substantially outperform all state-of-the-art tested.