Self-Enforcing Voluntary Disclosures

摘要: This paper extends previous accounting research which asks why firms do not voluntarily disclose all value-relevant information, as implied by, for example, Grossman [1981] and Milgrom [1981]. While these two models assume disclosures are costless verifiable, subsequent papers by Verrecchia [1983], Dye [1985 b], Darrough Stoughton [1990], Wagenhofer Feltham Xie [1992], Newman Sansing [1993] suggest withhold private information to avoid proprietary costs.1 In contrast models, I show that costs can actually increase voluntary generating credibility such disclosures. model the decision when independent verification is impossible, too costly, or otherwise unavailable. The results rationalize unverified disclosures, market reactions them, showing of disclosing make credible, even without verification. model, a firm with about demand its product makes direct public disclosure both competitor capital market. would like convince high, thereby increasing value