The evolution of private property

作者: Herbert Gintis

DOI: 10.1016/J.JEBO.2006.02.002

关键词: MicroeconomicsNatural (music)Endowment effectPrivate propertyAnimal conflictEconomicsBourgeoisieEnforcement

摘要: Experimental studies have shown that subjects exhibit a systematic endowment effect. No acceptable explanation for the existence of this behavior has been offered. This paper shows effect can be modeled as respect private property in absence legal institutions ensuring third-party contract enforcement. In sense, “natural” observed many species, form recognition territorial incumbency. We develop model loosely based on Hawk–Dove–Bourgeois game [Maynard Smith, J., Parker, G.A., 1976. The logic asymmetric contests. Animal Behaviour 24, 159–175) and War Attrition Price, G.R., 1973. animal conflict. Nature 246, 15–18] to explain natural evolution property.

参考文章(41)
Roger Bakeman, John R. Brownlee, Social Rules Governing Object Conflicts in Toddlers and Preschoolers Springer, New York, NY. pp. 99- 111 ,(1982) , 10.1007/978-1-4613-8180-8_5
S. Zeki, O. R. Goodenough, Jeffrey Evans Stake, The property 'instinct'. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B. ,vol. 359, pp. 1763- 1774 ,(2004) , 10.1098/RSTB.2004.1551
John Tooby, Leda Cosmides, Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. Oxford University Press. ,(1992)
John Tooby, Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, The Adapted mind : evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture Oxford University Press. ,(1992)
John Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games ,(1982)
J Maynard Smith, George R Price, None, The Logic of Animal Conflict Nature. ,vol. 246, pp. 15- 18 ,(1973) , 10.1038/246015A0
John Maynard Smith, G.A. Parker, The logic of asymmetric contests Animal Behaviour. ,vol. 24, pp. 159- 175 ,(1976) , 10.1016/S0003-3472(76)80110-8
J. C. Senar, M. Camerino, N. B. Metcalfe, Agonistic interactions in siskin flocks: Why are dominants sometimes subordinate? Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology. ,vol. 25, pp. 141- 145 ,(1989) , 10.1007/BF00302931