作者: Herbert Gintis
DOI: 10.1016/J.JEBO.2006.02.002
关键词: Microeconomics 、 Natural (music) 、 Endowment effect 、 Private property 、 Animal conflict 、 Economics 、 Bourgeoisie 、 Enforcement
摘要: Experimental studies have shown that subjects exhibit a systematic endowment effect. No acceptable explanation for the existence of this behavior has been offered. This paper shows effect can be modeled as respect private property in absence legal institutions ensuring third-party contract enforcement. In sense, “natural” observed many species, form recognition territorial incumbency. We develop model loosely based on Hawk–Dove–Bourgeois game [Maynard Smith, J., Parker, G.A., 1976. The logic asymmetric contests. Animal Behaviour 24, 159–175) and War Attrition Price, G.R., 1973. animal conflict. Nature 246, 15–18] to explain natural evolution property.