作者: William S. Laufer , Steven D. Walt
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4757-4038-7_3
关键词: Judicial opinion 、 Public law 、 Legal duty 、 Discipline 、 Legal psychology 、 Epistemology 、 Normal science 、 Law 、 Precedent 、 Psychology 、 Comparative law
摘要: The literature relating law and psychology places significant emphasis on conceptual paradigmatic differences (Haney, 1980; Lochner, 1973; Marshall, 1966; Monahan & Loftus, 1982; Tapp, 1976). Divergent methods, reasoning, decision making underscore allegations of disciplinary incompatibility (cf. Melton, 1987; Walker, 1988). A prime example this incompatibility, it has been argued, may be found in psychology’s devotion to the scientific method explanation law’s reliance precedent judicial making. Psychology emphasizes creative innovative research, unhampered by constraints imposed history. As Haney (1980) observed, “there is no conscious constant attempt link present past.