Boolean games revisited
作者： Elise Bonzon , Marie-Christine Lagasquie-Schiex , Jérôme Lang , Bruno Zanuttini
DOI:
关键词: Normal-form game 、 Propositional formula 、 Mathematical economics 、 Combinatorial game theory 、 Boolean function 、 Propositional variable 、 Best response 、 Screening game 、 Computer science 、 Repeated game
摘要: Game theory is a widely used formal model for studying strategical interactions between agents. Boolean games [8] are two players, zero-sum static where players' utility functions binary and described by single propositional formula, the strategies available to player consist of truth assignments each given set variables (the controlled player.) We generalize framework n-players which not necessarily zero-sum. give simple characterizations Nash equilibria dominated strategies, investigate computational complexity related problems.
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