作者: Michelle Li
DOI:
关键词: Regression analysis 、 Business 、 Information environment 、 Accounting firm 、 Corporate governance 、 Negative association 、 Accounting 、 Utility maximization 、 Sample (statistics) 、 Shareholder
摘要: This study primarily investigates the determinants of CEO membership New Zealand (NZ) boards, and effect board on firm performance, for publiclylisted NZ firms between 1997 to 2008. The project is conducted using a unique handcollected panel dataset containing information about participation board, characteristics, ownership, governance. sample covers twelve-year period. statistics reveal that average, approximately 30% CEOs do not sit their company board. In addition, number (percentage) incidences off has been increasing. Specifically, percentage was 20% in but 42% Models examining indicate probability significantly related opacity firms’ environment strength governance environment. affected by size, age, independent directors, multiple directorships companies. particular, size directors possess economic significance. negative association consistent with utility maximization. I also find although positively ROA, ROE Jensen’s alpha basic regression models, positive observed accounting performance models disappears after controlling self-selection. other words, better tend appoint may attribute possibility optimally determined shareholders. evidence from market-based model reflects shareholder interests self-selection behavior. As an additional analysis, examine different degrees involvement where are categorized into CEO-director