The expert problem: a survey

作者: Irene Valsecchi

DOI: 10.1007/S10101-013-0129-Y

关键词: Action (philosophy)Advice (complexity)Information asymmetrySubject-matter expertVerifiable secret sharingSpecial caseCheap talkKnowledge managementEconomicsReputationPublic relations

摘要: The survey is focused on the typical problems in information transmission from experts to non-experts. Attention paid factors that can affect disclosure models apply a game-theoretic approach use of professional advice. In economic literature expertise mainly analyzed as special case asymmetric between expert and non-expert. contributions are reviewed according double criterion, takes into account both preferences properties communication. On one side, either non-expert plays role decision-maker, who chooses an action payoff-relevant for expert, or directly depend some measure his reputation high-ability forecaster. other communication range pure cheap talk completely verifiable messages.

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