作者: Irene Valsecchi
DOI: 10.1007/S10101-013-0129-Y
关键词: Action (philosophy) 、 Advice (complexity) 、 Information asymmetry 、 Subject-matter expert 、 Verifiable secret sharing 、 Special case 、 Cheap talk 、 Knowledge management 、 Economics 、 Reputation 、 Public relations
摘要: The survey is focused on the typical problems in information transmission from experts to non-experts. Attention paid factors that can affect disclosure models apply a game-theoretic approach use of professional advice. In economic literature expertise mainly analyzed as special case asymmetric between expert and non-expert. contributions are reviewed according double criterion, takes into account both preferences properties communication. On one side, either non-expert plays role decision-maker, who chooses an action payoff-relevant for expert, or directly depend some measure his reputation high-ability forecaster. other communication range pure cheap talk completely verifiable messages.