The Design of Institutions: An Agency Theory Perspective

作者: Jeffrey S. Banks

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-0641-2_2

关键词: Perspective (graphical)Information asymmetryPolitical scienceMicroeconomicsPublic economicsInstitutional designPrincipal–agent problemGoods and servicesNash equilibrium

摘要: Agency theory provides a systematic analysis of bilateral or multilateral exchange goods and services in the presence various factors that bring into question neoclassical assumption costless transactions. These include most prominently forms asymmetric information, wherein one party to an has better information about consequences such than does another. The goal agency is identify efficient organizational responses these complicating factors; intent this chapter survey some principle results from literature view as fundamental building blocks design institutions

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