作者: Rebecca S. Epanchin-Niell , James E. Wilen
DOI:
关键词: Total cost 、 Control (management) 、 Discount points 、 Natural resource economics 、 Economics 、 Actuarial science 、 Cost–benefit analysis 、 Scale (social sciences) 、 Incentive 、 Damages 、 Externality
摘要: As a bioinvasion spreads across landscape from its point of introduction, damages rise roughly with the square distance original invasion. It is thus generally beneficial, at scale, to apply eradication or containment controls early if not immediately upon discovery. However, an individual property owner only has incentives consider costs and benefits control on his/her own rather than potential landscape-scale damages. Bioinvasions will therefore be under-controlled in independent owners operating under laissez-faire system. A mechanism needed induce cooperative contributions beneficiaries who would, without them, invaded later. We develop spatially-explicit, integrated model invasion spread human behavior examine how different degrees spatial cooperation affect patterns total imposed. compare laissez-faire, by adjacent neighbors, groups including more distant but nearby neighbors. expected, private decisions tend under-control relative socially optimal most circumstances. But reasonably high fraction first best payoffs can achieved modest geographical reach cooperation. also find that less extensive invasions whose otherwise lead largest externalities (circumstances are relatively low compared damages). This suggests even small amounts bioinvasions provide large social benefits.