Rational Partisan Theory with fiscal policy and an independent central bank
作者： Montserrat Ferré , Carolina Manzano
DOI: 10.1016/J.JMACRO.2014.06.003
关键词: Macroeconomics 、 Fiscal policy 、 Public spending 、 Economics 、 Inflation 、 Empirical evidence 、 Keynesian economics 、 Central bank 、 Inclusion (education)
摘要: Abstract The empirical evidence testing the validity of Rational Partisan Theory (RPT) has been mixed. In this article, we argue that inclusion other macroeconomic policies and presence an independent central bank can partly contribute to explain inconclusiveness. This article expands Alesina’s (1987) RPT model include extra policy bank. With these extensions, theoretical implications are altered significantly. particular, when is more concerned about output than public spending (an assumption made by many papers in literature), then direct relationship between inflation derived Alesina never holds.
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