Learning to play Cournot duopoly strategies
作者： James C Cox , Mark Walker
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(98)00060-2
关键词: Mathematical economics 、 Marginal cost 、 Microeconomics 、 Learning models 、 Boundary (topology) 、 Constant (mathematics) 、 Duopoly 、 Economics 、 Cournot competition
摘要: Abstract The paper reports results from experiments designed to determine whether subjects can learn play Cournot duopoly strategies and their out-of-equilibrium is consistent with the predictions of learning models. include duopolies constant decreasing marginal costs, theoretically stable unstable equilibria. After a few periods, do interior equilibria but they not boundary nor Subjects' inconsistent
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