Stock options and chief executive officer compensation
作者： Chris S. Armstrong , David F. Larcker , Che-Lin Su
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.987693
关键词: Sample (statistics) 、 Stochastic game 、 Actuarial science 、 Space (commercial competition) 、 Restricted stock 、 Contract management 、 Incentive 、 Non-qualified stock option 、 Business 、 Moral hazard
摘要: Although stock options are commonly observed in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation contracts, there is theoretical controversy about whether part of the optimal contract. Using a sample Fortune 500 companies, we solve an agency model calibrated to company-specific data and find that almost always This result robust alternative assumptions level CEO risk-aversion disutility associated with their effort. In supplementary analysis, for contract when no restrictions on space. We (which characterized as state-contingent payoff CEO) typically has option-like features over most probable range outcomes.Paper published as: "Endogenous Selection Moral Hazard Compensation Contracts" Operations Research, Linthicum 58 (July/August 2010): 1090-1106.
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