Distributed computing meets game theory: robust mechanisms for rational secret sharing and multiparty computation

作者: Ittai Abraham , Danny Dolev , Rica Gonen , Joe Halpern

DOI: 10.1145/1146381.1146393

关键词: Game theoryComputer scienceNash equilibriumTheoretical computer scienceComputationBest responseSecret sharingDistributed computingSecure multi-party computationRational agent

摘要: We study k-resilient Nash equilibria, joint strategies where no member of a coalition C size up to k can do better, even if the whole defects. show that such equilibria exist for secret sharing and multiparty computation, provided players prefer get information than not it. Our results hold there are only 2 players, so we computation with two rational agents. extend our they in presence t "unexpected" utilities. Finally, techniques be used simulate games mediators by without mediators.

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