Decision-Theoretic Prediction and Policy Design of GDP Slot Auctions

摘要: We examine the potential for a simple auction to allocate arrival slots during Ground Delay Programs (GDP’s) more efficiently than currently used sys- tem. The analysis of these auctions uses Predictive Game Theory (PGT) Wolpert and Bono (2010a,b), new approach that produces probability distribution over strategies instead an equilibrium set. compare with other allocation methods, including combinatorial theoretical benchmarks using data from one-hour GDP at Chicago Midway. find slot overcomes several practical shortcomings approaches, while offering economically significant efficiency gains respect current practices lower airline costs. also second price version dominates first in nearly every decision-relevant category. This is despite fact none conventional arguments auctions, such as dominant strategy implementability, even apply auctions. Finally, results indicate if made operationally practical, might be efficient our auction, though does not implement social optimum strategies.