So what do I get? The bank's view of lending relationships

作者: Sreedhar Bharath , Sandeep Dahiya , Anthony Saunders , Anand Srinivasan

DOI: 10.1016/J.JFINECO.2005.08.003

关键词: DebtEquity (finance)EconomicsEmpirical researchMonetary economicsActuarial scienceInformation asymmetryLoanUnderwriting

摘要: Abstract While many empirical studies document borrower benefits of lending relationships, less is known about lender benefits. A relationship lender's informational advantage over a non-relationship may generate higher probability selling information-sensitive products to its borrowers. Our results show that the providing future loan 42%, while for lender, this 3%. Consistent with theory, we find borrowers greater information asymmetries are significantly likely obtain loans from their lenders. Relationship lenders be chosen provide debt/equity underwriting services, but effect economically small.

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