作者: Austen Clark
DOI: 10.1016/B978-044451540-7/50022-0
关键词: Cognitive science 、 Cognitive psychology 、 Perception 、 Common sense 、 Selective attention 、 Illusion 、 First person 、 Unconscious mind 、 Perspective (graphical) 、 Property (philosophy) 、 Psychology
摘要: Publisher Summary This chapter deals with important philosophical problems that arise in the psychology of perception. It describes way psychological experiments on unconscious stages perception reveal aspects are very different from one's conscious experience. Early or preattentive perceptual processes start at transducers and end where selective attention has access to results can select some favored few for further processing. The illustrates scientific findings challenge common sense conceptions mind. Different authors mean things by term “phenomenal property.” traditional notion is one used characterize sensory illusions effects already familiar, well-behaved, well-ensconced models psychologists. empirical provide explanations least these phenomenal properties. Phenomenal properties as traditionally understood almost invariably accompanied awareness. Any example a property identifiable first person perspective necessarily which author aware.