Population density elites and the distribution of infrastructural resources in Thailand.

摘要: This paper operationalizes both political-economic and ecological/economic explanations of infrastructure development (roads water electrification) using 1970 provincial data (except for the Bangkok Metropolis) from Thailand. The approach states that because elites make decisions which disproportionately benefit interests their class policies create or perpetuate regional economic inequalities. stresses needs "central" "non-central" as a key force behind policy implementation in sharp contrast to public need imagery formulations. In Thailand decision making is extremely centralized highly elitist there are clear examples use accumulation social control. findings support those previous studies; distribution infrastructural resources primarily function gross product per capita (GPP) density presence elites. variables explain almost much variance do variables. Because patrimonial society patrons clients possess other needs. Provincial role able demand therefore villages without large local elite political stratum fail receive share available projects resources. Both inherent elitism actual behavior entrepreneurs administrators bureaucrats show allocated where present.