Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
作者： Jacques Cremer , Richard P. McLean
DOI: 10.2307/1911240
关键词: Interdependence 、 Economics 、 Interdependent valuations 、 Microeconomics 、 Actuarial science
摘要:
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sci-hub.se 参考文章(4)
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