Coordination as a Criterion for Economic “Goodness”

作者: Israel M. Kirzner

DOI: 10.1023/A:1009039219665

关键词: MicroeconomicsPublic economicsPreferenceProcess (engineering)Affect (psychology)EconomicsMethodological individualismConstitutional law

摘要: Welfare economics requires a criterion for economic “goodness” in regard to society. Unlike conventional criteria, “coordination” (among independent decisionmakers) does not violate methodological individualism. The coordination can be objectively deployed judge events or policies, referring only the given preference rankings of relevant individuals, their initial positions. An important variant refers attained (or unattained) state achieved coordination, but ability policies affect process through which better-coordinated may approached. Several implications are explored.

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