Strategic and financial bidders in takeover auctions

作者: ALEXANDER  S. GORBENKO , ANDREY MALENKO

DOI: 10.1111/JOFI.12194

关键词: FinanceBusinessMicroeconomicsCommon value auctionValue (economics)Sample (statistics)Willingness to pay

摘要: Using data on auctions of companies, we estimate valuations (maximum willingness to pay) strategic and financial bidders from their bids. We find that a typical target is valued higher by bidders. However, 22.4% targets in our sample are These mature, poorly performing companies. also (i) different more dispersed (ii) correlated with aggregate economic conditions. Our results suggest appeal types bidders, rather than always value because synergies.

参考文章(63)
Paul R. Milgrom, Robert J. Weber, A theory of auctions and competitive bidding Econometrica. ,vol. 50, pp. 1089- 1122 ,(1982) , 10.2307/1911865
Andrey Malenko, Nadya Malenko, A Theory of LBO Activity Based on Repeated Debt-Equity Conflicts Social Science Research Network. ,(2015) , 10.2139/SSRN.2251169
Sanford J. Grossman, Oliver D. Hart, Take-Over Bids, the Free Rider Problem and the Theory of the Corporation The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science. ,vol. 11, pp. 42- 64 ,(1980) , 10.2307/3003400
Kent D. Daniel, David A. Hirshleifer, A Theory of Costly Sequential Bidding Social Science Research Network. ,(1998) , 10.2139/SSRN.161013
Marc Martos-Vila, Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, Jarrad Harford, Financial vs. Strategic Buyers Social Science Research Network. ,(2013) , 10.3386/W19378
Harry J. Paarsch, Bjarne Brendstrup, NONPARAMETRIC ESTIMATION OF DUTCH AND FIRST-PRICE, SEALED-BID AUCTION MODELS WITH ASYMMETRIC BIDDERS ∗ Research Papers in Economics. ,(2003)
Marc Martos-Vila, Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, Jarrad Harford, Financial Buyers vs. Strategic Buyers Social Science Research Network. ,(2013) , 10.2139/SSRN.1725031
Paul R. Milgrom, Putting Auction Theory to Work ,(2004)