Building Property Rights: Capitalists and the Demand for Law in Post-Soviet Russia

作者: Jordan Luc Gans-Morse

DOI:

关键词: LawlessnessPolitical scienceVirtuous circle and vicious circlePoliticsEconomic systemProperty rightsLawIncentiveForeign direct investmentRule of lawGovernment

摘要: Author(s): Gans-Morse, Jordan Luc | Advisor(s): Zysman, John Abstract: The importance of property rights to economic and political development is widely recognized. Yet it remains unclear why institutions for protecting often fail emerge. Many scholars focus on leaders’ incentives assume that if are “supplied,” then firms will automatically use them. By contrast, this study emphasizes circumvent or subvert newly created institutions. Consequently, theories formation should not exclusively whether leaders create They must also explain the conditions under which actually formal protection.This analyzes firms’ strategies in Russia identifies rely state Observers frequently narrowly high-profile disputes mistakenly conclude lawlessness 1990s persists. However, my original survey Russian enterprises in-depth interviews with firms, lawyers, private security agencies reveal a remarkable shift over time: Whereas used illegal coercion — such as mafia rackets protect property, today they increasingly utilize law To examine strategies, I develop an analytical framework based evolutionary game theory. draws attention several key characteristics institutional development: (1) expected payoffs depend interplay direct effects (i.e., exogenous factors determine benefits costs given strategy) interactive extent other economy strategy). (2) Over time, more effective become predominant, due mechanisms natural selection adaptive learning. (3) A tipping point exists, at society begins break from vicious cycle virtuous cycle. Relatively small changes can therefore initiate self-reinforcing cycles large effects. Based framework, investigates sources change strategies. past decade, incentive transformation has occurred. Firms now recognize tool than alternatives, informal connections government officials. Three types have shifted constraints versus legal favor law: organizational within evolution firm ownership structures; spheres, including tax administration banking sector; outside domestic system, inflow foreign investment. Incentive structures variation across property. nature threats available resources shape relative using Analysis these two predicts most likely strategies: medium-sized rather firms; produce physical products services; operate large-scale local markets; (4) lack This study’s conclusion explores pathways rule transition developing countries, specific reference Russia. Whether take root depends outcome conflicting tendencies: increasing demand by decreasing supply predatory

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