作者: Saru Kumari , Shehzad Ashraf Chaudhry , Fan Wu , Xiong Li , Mohammad Sabzinejad Farash
DOI: 10.1007/S12083-015-0409-0
关键词: Session Initiation Protocol 、 Oakley protocol 、 Otway–Rees protocol 、 Reflection attack 、 Authentication protocol 、 Computer network 、 Computer science 、 Wide Mouth Frog protocol 、 Cryptographic protocol 、 Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol 、 Computer security
摘要: Sessioninitiation protocol (SIP) reformed the controlling routine of voice over Internet Protocol based communication public channels. SIP is inherently insecure because underlying open text architecture. A number solutions are proposed to boost security. Very recently Farash (Peer Peer Netw. Appl. 1–10, 2014) an enhanced improve security Tu et al.’s 1–8, 2014). Further, claimed his be secure against all known attacks. However, in this paper we show that Farash’s impersonation attack, password guessing lacks user anonymity and vulnerable session-specific temporary information attack. have upgraded enhance The performance analysis shows reduced one point multiplication as compared with protocol, while resisting We proved using automated tool ProVerif.