作者: Steffen Hertog
DOI:
关键词: Foreign direct investment 、 Elite 、 Politics 、 State (polity) 、 Bureaucracy 、 Economic stagnation 、 Modernization theory 、 Economy 、 Engineering 、 Rentier state 、 Political economy
摘要: In Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats, the most thorough treatment of political economy Saudi Arabia to date, Steffen Hertog uncovers an untold history how elite rivalries whims half a century ago have shaped today's state are reflected in its policies. Starting late 1990s, embarked on ambitious reform campaign remedy long-term economic stagnation. The results been puzzling for both area specialists economists: institutions not failed across board, as theorists "rentier state" would predict, nor they achieved all-encompassing modernization regime has touted. Instead, kingdom witnessed bewildering melange failures surprising successes. argues that it is traits peculiar make sense uneven capacities. Oil rents since World War II ways far from uniform. money given elites unusual leeway various institutional experiments different parts state: some cases creating massive rent-seeking networks deeply interwoven with local society; others large but passive bureaucracies; yet insulated islands remarkable efficiency. This process fragmented into uncoordinated set vertically divided fiefdoms. Case studies foreign investment reform, labor market nationalization WTO accession reveal this oil-funded apparatus enables swift successful policy-making policy areas, produces coordination regulation others.