作者: Stefan Rüster , Thorsten Holz , Felix Schuster
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-39235-1_12
关键词: Computer science 、 File Transfer Protocol 、 Operating system 、 Privilege escalation 、 Software architecture 、 Access control list 、 Adversary 、 Software 、 Application server
摘要: We often rely on system components implemented by potentially untrusted parties. This implies the risk of backdoors, i.e., hidden mechanisms that elevate privileges an unauthenticated adversary or execute other malicious actions certain triggers. Hardware backdoors have received some attention lately and we address in this paper software backdoors. present a design approach for server applications can --- under assumptions protect against aiming at privilege escalation. proof-of-concept FTP to demonstrate practical feasibility our approach.