作者: Elmar Lukas , Sascha Mölls , Andreas Welling
DOI: 10.1016/J.EJOR.2015.10.051
关键词: Social venture capital 、 Finance 、 Equity (finance) 、 Game theory 、 Empirical research 、 Financial economics 、 Volatility (finance) 、 Venture capital 、 Economics 、 Compound option
摘要: Abstract Our paper presents a dynamic model of entrepreneurial venture financing under uncertainty based on option exercise games between an entrepreneur and capitalist (VC). In particular, we analyze the impact multi-staged both economic technological optimal contracting in context VC-financing. novel approach combines compound pricing with sequential non-cooperative contracting, allowing us to determine whether renegotiation will improve probability coming agreement proceed venture. It is shown that sources positively VC-investor's equity share. Specifically, higher leads larger stake venture, may result dramatic shift control rights preventing from failure. Moreover, given ventures low volatility, situations might occur where VC-investor loses his first-mover advantage. Based comparative-static analysis, new testable hypotheses for further empirical studies are derived model.