作者: Urszula Boryczka , Przemyslaw Juszczuk
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-23938-0_49
关键词: Symmetric equilibrium 、 Computer science 、 Equilibrium selection 、 Lemke–Howson algorithm 、 Trembling hand perfect equilibrium 、 Best response 、 Mathematical optimization 、 Epsilon-equilibrium 、 Nash equilibrium 、 Correlated equilibrium
摘要: Nash equilibrium is one of the main concepts in game theory. Recently it was shown, that problem finding and an approximate PPAD-complete. In this article we adapt Differential Evolution algorithm (DE) to above problem. It may be classified as continuous problem, where two probability distributions over set pure strategies both players should found. Every deviation from global optimum interpreted approximation called e-Nash equilibrium. We show, approach can determined iterative method, which successive iterations capable obtain e value close optimum. The contribution paper experimental analysis proposed indication it's strong features. try demonstrate, method very good alternative for existing mathematical mentioned