Financial Supervision Unification and Central Bank Fragmentation Effect

作者: Donato Masciandaro

DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.808966

关键词: ProbitFinanceStatus quoReputationEconomicsEndowment effectBank reconciliationUnificationMoral hazardOrdered logit

摘要: This paper analyses how the central bank role can influence unification process of overall financial supervision architecture. We claim that policymaker's choices be viewed as a sequential in which institutional status quo matters. The degree is decided based on position bank. If involvement and its reputation are high, level likely to low, vice versa. fragmentation effect explained through three possible channels: moral hazard effect, bureaucracy endowment effect. empirical analysis - performed with ordered logit probit functions dataset 89 countries confirmed robustness

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