Hardening OpenStack Cloud Platforms against Compute Node Compromises

作者: Wai Kit Sze , Abhinav Srivastava , R. Sekar

DOI: 10.1145/2897845.2897851

关键词: ScalabilitySecurity policyDistributed computingFree accessComputer scienceMandatory access controlComputer securityCloud computingVirtual machine

摘要: Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) clouds such as OpenStack consist of two kinds nodes in their infrastructure: control and compute nodes. While run all critical services, host virtual machines customers. Given the large number nodes, fact that they are hosting VMs (possibly malicious) customers, it is possible some may be compromised. This paper examines impact a compromise. We focus on OpenStack, popular open-source cloud plat- form widely adopted. show attackers com- promising single node can extend controls over entire infrastructure. They then gain free access to resources have not paid for, or even bring down whole affect startling result stems from platform's misplaced trust, which does match today's threats. To overcome weakness, we propose new system, called SOS , for hardening OpenStack. limits trust consists framework enforce wide range security policies. Specifically, applied mandatory capabilities con- fine interactions among different components. Effective confinement policies generated automatically. Furthermore, requires no modifications has allowed us deploy multiple versions Our experimental results demonstrate scalable, incurs negligible overheads offers strong protection.

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