作者: Gregory Jackson
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.569541
关键词: Compromise 、 Positive economics 、 Reinterpretation 、 Economic system 、 Economics 、 German model 、 Institutional theory 、 Ambiguity 、 Diversity (business) 、 Labor relations 、 Industrial relations
摘要: This article examines the role of ambiguity in processes institutional change. One challenge for understanding change is to overcome rather "oversocialized" view action within Institutional theory. Drawing upon recent work sociology, paper introduces a non-teleological model that stresses institutionalized beliefs. Ambiguity then applied Masahiko Aoki's concept institutions as "summary representation" strategic game. Rather than break down, associated with incremental modes through creative reinterpretation and redeployment old new purposes. Empirically, applies these considerations historical evolution employee codetermination Germany. The continuity formal legal rules contrasts remarkable diversity an organizational practice-over time, across industrial sectors between individual firms. Codetermination illustrates how originated political compromise, but also ambiguous agreement allows scope innovation. is, thus, central was partially reproduced changed over time.