Subgame Consistent Cooperative Solution in Differential Games

摘要: Subgame consistency is a fundamental element in the solution of cooperative stochastic differential games which ensures that extension policy to later starting time and any possible state brought about by prior optimal behavior players would remain optimal. In many game situations payoff (or utility) may not be transferable. It well known utility economic study assumed non-transferrable or comparable among agents. The Nash (1950, 1953) bargaining for non-transferable games. Strategic interactions involving national security, social issues political gains fall into category utility/payoff (NTU) case when payoffs are nontransferable, transfer payments cannot made subgame consistent mechanism becomes extremely complicated. this Chapter, issue with nontransferable presented. particular, Chapter an integrated exposition works Yeung Petrosyan (2005) et al. (2007). organized as follows. formulation games, corresponding Pareto trajectories individual player’s under cooperation provided Sect. 6.1. notion NTU invariant weights examined 6.2. Section 6.3, class developed illustrate derivation solutions. solutions 6.3 investigated 6.4. Numerical delineations presented 6.4 given 6.5. An analysis on infinite horizon 6.6. A chapter appendices containing proofs 6.7. notes 6.8 problems 6.9.