Quantity Discounts, Manufacturer and Channel Profit Maximization: Impact of Retailer Heterogeneity

作者: Subramanian Balachander , Kannan Srinivasan

DOI: 10.1023/A:1007909032191

关键词: BusinessMicroeconomicsProfit (economics)Profit maximizationChannel coordination

摘要: In this paper, we investigate if a manufacturer can simultaneously maximize own and channel profit with any quantity-based pricing policy, including quantity-discount when selling through heterogeneous retailers. We show that the manufacturer's best possible retailers self-select quantities, is quantity discount. However, policy does not profit. Driven by inclination to reduce sold high-cost or low-demand retailer, result holds whether compete. discuss implications of our analysis for manufacturer.

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