Agency-Freedom and Option-Freedom

作者: Philip Pettit

DOI: 10.1177/09516298030154003

关键词: EpistemologySociologyAgency (philosophy)LawFocus (linguistics)Representation (arts)

摘要: The recent debates about the nature of social freedom, understood in a broadly negative way, have generated three main views topic: these represent freedom respectively as non-limitation, non-interference and non-domination. participants often go different ways, however, because they address topics under common names, not hold intuitions on topics. Social is sometimes option-freedom, agency-freedom directions taken by theories can be explained their addressing one sense, then another. non-limitation approach focuses primarily non-domination agency-freedom, whereas representation seems to spring from failure resolve focus decisively target or

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