DETECTING COLLUSION IN PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS
作者： Patrick Bajari , Garrett Summers
DOI:
关键词: Cartel 、 Collusion 、 Competition (economics) 、 Microeconomics 、 Statute 、 Forward auction 、 Business 、 Procurement auctions 、 Reverse auction
摘要: Collusion is an agreement among a group of firms, called cartel, designed to limit competition the participants. If all firms in cartel follow agreement, buyers will face higher prices, giving members profits above normal competitive level. State and federal statutes have proscribed such agreements protect consumers from collusive behavior, considerable resources are expended every year on investigation prosecution colluders.
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