作者: Zong-Hong Cao , Yong-Wu Zhou , Ju Zhao , Chang-Wen Li
DOI: 10.1016/J.JRETCONSER.2015.04.005
关键词: Industrial organization 、 Supply chain management 、 Supply chain 、 Value-added service 、 Single market 、 Service (business) 、 Business 、 Product (business) 、 Competition (economics) 、 Value (economics) 、 Commerce
摘要: Abstract This paper considers a supply chain where manufacturer sells its product through retailer. In such market, potential entrant can make substitute by imitating the incumbent's and then it to common market with one of three alternative entry modes: (i) selling retailer, (ii) another independent or (iii) directly consumers. Faced entrant's entry, has managed offer value-added service add product's value at cost. We investigate optimal mode when offers profit-sharing contracts retailer does not, discuss impact invader's on incumbent firms' performances. The results show that: (1) consumers faced weak competition, against fierce competition. (2) If competition is relatively efficiency high as well, firms benefit from new entry. (3) A contract, coordination policy, fully coordinate no matter whether there exists yet affect distribution profits between