Targeting, Accountability and Capture in Development Projects

作者: Matthew S. Winters

DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1643381

关键词: IdentifiabilityCLARITYInternational developmentAccountabilityPublic relationsPublic economicsTransparency (market)EconomicsWorldwide Governance IndicatorsNegative relationship

摘要: If development projects are to be effective, a minimum requirement is that the funding reaches its intended destination. Yet history of international replete with examples this not happening. I argue there will fewer problems corruption or other diversions --- which jointly label capture in more precisely targeted projects. More well-defined targeting results superior accountability relationships because greater clarity responsibility, clearer information about outcomes and improved identifiability stakeholders. use an original cross-country, cross-project dataset on incidence World Bank-funded investment test theory. The data show negative relationship between capture, demonstrate robust variety specifications. In addition, find higher baseline likelihood project countries perceived as corrupt according commonly used survey-based measures from Transparency International Worldwide Governance Indicators, cross-validating those my own.

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