Are all mutuals the same? Evidence from CEO turnover in the US property–casualty insurance industry

作者: Jiang Cheng , J. David Cummins , Tzuting Lin

DOI: 10.1057/S10713-020-00059-8

关键词: Multinomial probitRisk managementFinancial servicesInsurance industryActuarial scienceProperty insuranceStock (geology)EconomicsCorporate governanceHomogeneousBusiness, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)Economics and EconometricsAccountingFinance

摘要: Organizational form in insurance has been widely studied the prior literature. Although researchers have recognized sub-types of stock insurers, mutuals always considered as a single homogeneous category. To extent that mutual behave differently, considering all same can result misleading conclusions. The present study aims to remedy this gap literature by full range firm types. Mutuals are classified family-controlled, association-controlled, and pure with various within each group. We analyze corporate governance among U.S. property–casualty (P–C) industry studying CEO turnover, particularly nonroutine turnover. Multinomial probit analysis is used test for relationships between principal finding not same. probability turnover lowest non-association highest association-controlled mutuals. Non-association family-member CEOs rates ownership Thus, future research should utilize more detailed organizational categories than traditional

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