作者: Anil Doshi , Glen Dowell , Michael W. Toffel
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1879248
关键词: Environmental strategy 、 Institutional theory 、 Information disclosure 、 Marketing 、 Power (social and political) 、 Public economics 、 Economics 、 Empirical evidence
摘要: Mandatory information disclosure regulations seek to create institutional pressure spur performance improvement. By examining how organizational characteristics moderate establishments’ responses a prominent environmental program, we provide among the first empirical evidence characterizing heterogeneous by those mandated disclose information. We find particularly rapid improvement establishments located close their headquarters and with proximate siblings, especially when siblings are in same industry. Large improve more slowly than small sparse regions, but both groups similarly dense suggesting that density mitigates power of large resist pressures. Finally, privately held firms’ outperform owned public firms. highlight implications for theory, managers, policymakers.