TOLL COMPETITION IN HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS

摘要: Within a highway transportation network, the social welfare implications of two different groups agents setting tolls in competition for revenues are studied. The first group comprises private sector toll road operators aiming to maximise revenues. second local governments or jurisdictions who may engage tax exporting. Extending insights from public economics literature, export because when their electorate, they simultaneously benefit extra-jurisdictional users. Hence levied by both will be higher than those intended solely internalise congestion, which then results losses. Therefore overarching question investigated is extent losses stemming such revenues. While these separately studied, interactions between each can modelled within common framework Equilibrium Problems with Constraints. Several solution algorithms, adapting methodologies microeconomics as well evolutionary computation, proposed identify Nash levels. These demonstrated on realistic networks. As an alternative paradigm competition, possibilities co-operation also explored. In case operators, consequences could positive adverse depending interrelationships roads competition. therefore generalise previously obtained more here. In jurisdictions, it shown that fiscal externality exporting resulting decisions substantially reduce gains internalising congestion. ability regulation, and bilateral bargaining assessed. research thus contributes informing debates regarding appropriate level institutional governance pricing policies.