作者: Sean Crawford
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_49
关键词: Logical positivism 、 Meaning (philosophy of language) 、 Logical atomism 、 Epistemology 、 Philosophy 、 Logical truth 、 Received view of theories 、 Positivism 、 Philosophy of psychology 、 Phenomenon
摘要: The received view in the history of philosophy psychology is that logical positivists – Carnap and Hempel particular endorsed position commonly known as “logical” or “analytical” behaviourism, according to which relations between psychological statements physical-behavioural intended give their meaning are analytic knowable a priori. This chapter argues this sheer legend: most, if not all, such were viewed by synthetic only posteriori. It then traces origins legend positivists’ idiosyncratic extensional at best weakly intensional use what now considered crucially strongly semantic notions, “translation”, “meaning” cognates, focussing on instance latter phenomenon, arguing conflation explicit definition analyticity may be chief source legend.