Accounting for the Explanations of CEO Compensation: Substance and Symbolism
作者： Edward J. Zajac , James D. Westphal
DOI: 10.2307/2393639
关键词: Human resources 、 Period (music) 、 Incentive 、 Sociology 、 Politics 、 Executive compensation 、 Accounting 、 Agency (sociology) 、 Ambiguity
摘要: While current debates about CEO compensation have generally been dominated by economic and political perspectives on CEO/board relations, we argue in this paper that CEO …
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