Behavioral Spillovers with Interdependent Institutions: An Experimental Study∗

作者: Jenna Bednar , Scott Page , Yan Chen , Tracy Xiao Liu

DOI:

关键词: HeuristicsContext (language use)InstitutionPublic relationsManagementConstruct (philosophy)SociologyPalfreyInterdependenceAsia pacific

摘要: We describe laboratory experiments that produce behavioral spillovers across strategic contexts. In these subjects play two distinct games simultaneously with different opponents. find behavior is highly context dependent: when are paired in ensembles, differs from the isolated controls. Behavior also influenced by which other game composes ensemble, and predicted ways. These results suggest people do not treat each situation isolation but instead construct heuristics they apply games. The reject hypothesis independently; findings imply effect of a particular institution on depends upon full institutional context. have implications for any attempt to transport institutions contexts, including developmental programs constitutional designs. ∗This research was sponsored grants National Science Foundation, James S McDonnell United States Air Force Office Scientific Research MURI. would like thank Andrea Jones-Rooy excellent assistance data assembly analysis. indebted those who supplied thoughtful reactions our project, Tom Palfrey, Rajiv Sethi, seminar participants at annual meeting Midwest Political Association (Chicago, March 2007), ICER (Turin, June ESA Asia Pacific Meetings (July Santa Fe Institute 2007). †Department Science, University Michigan ‡School Information §School ¶Center Study Complex Systems, Departments Economics, 1

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