A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Interdependent Transportation Investment Projects
作者： Folke Snickars
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-60318-1_20
关键词: Interdependence 、 Cost–benefit analysis 、 Business 、 Nash equilibrium 、 Investment (macroeconomics) 、 Economies of scale 、 Phase (combat) 、 Microeconomics 、 Game theoretic 、 Knapsack problem
摘要: The transportation system conveys interdependencies. When analysing the costs and benefits of transport investment projects, it is therefore necessary to address question linkages among projects. Such can occur in terms economies scale arising from combination projects during construction phase. Linkages may also arise supply through interaction network components, or producers services. emerge demand creation new opportunities for interaction.
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