Game theory for security: Key algorithmic principles, deployed systems, lessons learned

作者: Milind Tambe , Manish Jain , James Adam Pita , Albert Xin Jiang

DOI: 10.1109/ALLERTON.2012.6483443

关键词: Computer scienceComputer securityNational securityConcrete securityNetwork security policyComputer security modelSecurity information and event managementSecurity through obscuritySecurity engineeringSecurity policy

摘要: Security is a critical concern around the world. In many security domains, limited resources prevent full coverage at all times; instead, these must be scheduled, avoiding schedule predictability, while simultaneously taking into account different target priorities, responses of adversaries to posture and potential uncertainty over adversary types. Computational game theory can help design such unpredictable schedules. Indeed, casting problem as Bayesian Stackelberg game, we have developed new algorithms that are now deployed multiple years in applications for scheduling. These leading real-world use-inspired research emerging area “security games” specifically, challenges posed by include scaling up games large-scale problems, handling significant adversarial uncertainty, dealing with bounded rationality human adversaries, other interdisciplinary challenges.

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