Essays on Trade Costs, Supply Chain Uncertainty and CEO Compensation

摘要: This dissertation consists of two chapters that examine high managerial pay and supply chain uncertainty. Chapter 1 constructs a game-theoretic model in which CEO emerges as the outcome an arms race, with each firm paying its highly to protect competitive position against rivals who also highly. For race emerge, highly-paid CEOs must generate idiosyncratic, privately-known internal effects on profit, disparities asymmetric profit differences from external beyond simple pay. If distribution satisfies key uniformity condition, only equilibrium game. 2 examines impact uncertainty ordering costs trade. Importers hold safety stock hedge delays delivery. An increase raises stocks, increases inventory costs, reduces imports locations delivery time order firm’s shipping frequency average holding cost for base stock. As result, firms import less reduce costs. Detailed data actual expected arrival times vessels at U.S. ports serve measure consistent theory. Combined detailed imports, freight charges unit values, 10 percent supply-chain lowers by much 3.7 percent. is evidence